The shaping of European modernities: Neapolitan hegelianism and the renaissance (1848-1862) by Gallo, Fernanda
1 
 
The Shaping of European Modernities: 
Neapolitan Hegelianism and the Renaissance (1848-1862) 
 
How deeply rooted in man is the desire 
to generalize about individuals or national characteristic 
 [Friedrich Schlegel, Critical Fragments] 
 
The idea of Europe is a product of modernity. As such, it needs to be understood in relation to 
discourses about and interpretations of modernity. As Gerard Delanty has commented: ‘The history 
of modern Europe can be written in terms of a conflict between the ideas of modernity.’1 The main 
theoretical approach for the analysis of the idea of Europe ought, therefore, to be the general context 
of modernity. However, from the beginning of the nineteenth century it has made more sense to 
discuss Europe in terms of multiple models of modernity, to better capture the different interpretations 
of the European heritage. Delanty has highlighted that the Renaissance was the transitional point to 
an emerging modernity which has shaped Europe’s cultural identity. This is partially because one of 
the distinguishing features of modern Europe ‘was the cultivation of a concept of the self that made 
possible […] a new emphasis on the human being as an individual and an objective of study and 
reflection’.2  
Under the general name of Renaissance, Delanty subsumes different and diverse cultural 
experiences such as humanism, republicanism, the Protestant Reformation and the encounter with the 
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non-European world. In the first half of the nineteenth century, however, the Renaissance was 
completely excluded from the main narratives about modernity – or rather it was defined as a pre-
modern and backward period, while the definition of modernity viewed the Reformation as the main 
historiographical paradigm. However, in Italy between 1848 and 1862 the main exponents of the 
philosophical movement known as Neapolitan Hegelianism3 were engaged in the definition of the 
Renaissance as the idea of modernity.4 The current literature has underestimated this interpretation 
of modernity and the consequent definition of the idea of Europe that the present study intends to 
analyse. This first discusses the widespread nineteenth-century historiographical thesis that viewed 
the Protestant Reformation as a key element of modernity, and it considers how this thesis affected 
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Risorgimento intellectual elites. It then examines the different interpretations of the Renaissance in 
the same period to demonstrate that, within Neapolitan Hegelianism, the concept of the Renaissance 
had become an interpretive paradigm of modernity through which a specific idea of Europe was 
shaped. Finally, it focuses on the main advocates of this philosophical movement, Bertrando Spaventa 
(1817-1883) and Francesco De Sanctis (1817-1883), who tried, in different ways, to define the Italian 
path to modernity, in the process proposing a new theoretical framework for understanding the idea 
of Europe. 
 
1. Protestant Reformation and European modernity  
The Italian historian Federico Chabod in his Storia dell’idea d’Europa claimed that: ‘The concept of 
Europe must have first been formed as an antithesis to that which is not Europe […] the first 
opposition between Europe and something that is not Europe is […] Asia – opposed in habits and 
culture, but, mainly, in political organization: Europe represents the spirit of freedom, against Oriental 
despotism.’5 As Roberto Dainotto has recently pointed out, the Europe-versus-Orient paradigm might 
be overlooking an alternative genesis of modern Europe.6 Between the end of the eighteenth century 
and the beginning of the nineteenth century, Europe began to conceive a new logic of self-definition 
that rendered the extra-European ‘other’ superfluous. This new logic culminated in Hegel’s 
Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807), in which the connection between modern freedom and 
Protestantism defined the antithesis of Europe as Europe’s own south. Accordingly, the discussion 
over freedom (Europe) and despotism (Asia) was translated into a modern rhetoric of north and south. 
The defining paradigm of modernity was long influenced by Hegel’s interpretation of the 
Reformation. Many nineteenth-century philosophies of history underlined the decisive role of 
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Protestantism in the origins of modernity, with an implied evaluation of Catholicism as a retrograde 
factor, and they proposed an interpretative framework that would prove to be long lasting.7 Indeed, 
European historiography was conditioned by a description of Catholic countries as backward on 
account of their historical development, and the subordinate and peripheral position of the southern 
regions, which were portrayed as a kind of ‘internal Orient’ of Europe, was assumed.  
The fifteenth century and the early sixteenth century marked the origin of the modern world. 
The Age of Discovery, the Renaissance and the Reformation ‘immediately spring to mind when one 
thinks of those decisive years’.8 However, by the middle of the nineteenth century Hegel’s philosophy 
of history had firmly established in many intellectual circles the notion that the Protestant 
Reformation was the main characteristic of modernity. The three driving forces of modernity – 
discovery, Renaissance and Reformation – ‘changed and the first two terms fade into subordinate 
positions, while the third is brilliantly elevated to become the central interpretative category’.9 The 
narrative about ‘Protestant supremacy’ would prove to be one of the more enduring cultural legacies 
of the nineteenth century. Moreover, recent literature has shown that Hegel was simply voicing a 
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commonly held contemporary idea.10 Underlying this idea was the exclusion of Catholic countries 
from the ‘path to modernity’ and minimisation of the decisive role played by Italy, Spain and Portugal, 
respectively the main agents of the Renaissance and the Age of Discovery. The result was that Italy, 
as well as Spain and Portugal, became an ‘internal Orient’ and a non-European Europe.11 Mainstream 
ideas of Europe were defined by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century historiography through an 
‘internal Orient’ within Europe, which was based mainly on the differences between religious beliefs: 
‘Catholics would be condemned to a relatively backward and subordinate position in the race of 
civilisation. Genuine liberalism and true progress were of a purely Protestant stamp.’12 Since 
Montesquieu’s classical definition, the idea of Europe as shaped by different religious beliefs in the 
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north and the south has often been associated with a sort of climatological assumption connecting a 
country’s positive laws to its physical geography:  
 
In Europe there is a kind of balance between the southern and the northern nations. The 
first have every riches of life, and few wants: the second have many wants and few riches. 
To one Nature has given much, and demands little; to the other she has given but little, 
and demands a lot. The equilibrium is maintained by the laziness of the southern nations 
and by the industry and activity which Nature has given to those in the north. […] This 
has naturalized slavery for the people of the south.13 
 
In Montesquieu’s works especially, the climatological narrative is intertwined with the notion of the 
‘Protestant supremacy’. As he argued in De l’esprit des lois, ‘the people of the north embraced the 
Protestant [religion]’ because of their ‘spirit of liberty and independence’, something which Catholic 
southern countries renounced.14 So, the narratives about the definition of European modernity and 
the shaping of the idea of European freedom, progress and civilisation both implied an internal 
‘other’, namely southern Europe. 
The nineteenth-century reflection upon the roots of modernity presents some peculiarities in 
the Italian case. In part, it was a consequence of Italy being the centre of the Catholic Church’s 
political power, making the country the target of Protestant criticism. The idea of Italian 
backwardness and moral weakness became widespread throughout Britain, Germany, France and 
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Switzerland.15 Interestingly, however, this view was also shared by a significant sector of the Italian 
intellectual elite, who saw the absence of an Italian Protestant Reformation as the cause of Italy’s lack 
of political liberty and its moral decadence. Modern scholarship is attentive to the ways in which this 
contributed to the creation of national stereotypes and their influence on the definition of the Italian 
‘national character’.16 However, much less attention has been paid to how this view influenced the 
Italian intellectual elite and – more importantly – their idea of Europe. As Nelson Moe has stated, the 
Italians realised that ‘Italy was a Southern country in a century when the superiority of “the North” 
was virtually beyond dispute’.17 The assumption that the Protestant Reformation was the key event 
of modernity shaping an idea of Europe was based on the opposition to an ‘otherness’ – that is, the 
European South. This ‘other’ was backward – implying a line of progress in the rise of civilisation – 
lazy, spendthrift and slave to the pleasures of life – implying a reluctance to work hard that was often 
connected to the warm climate – superstitious, ignorant and inclined to slavery and authoritative 
power – implying that Catholic morality and education led to an atavistic absence of civic 
consciousness which prevented Catholic countries from following the path to modernity and, 





                                                           
15 See, for example, Danilo Raponi, Religion and Politics in the Risorgimento: Britain and the New 
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2. Renaissance in the Risorgimento: a transnational perspective 
The idea that modernity coincided with the Protestant Reformation was very appealing to Italian 
liberals during the Risorgimento, so much so that some of them even converted to Protestantism.18 
On the other hand, conservative intellectuals, such as Vincenzo Gioberti, affirmed the moral 
superiority of Catholic civilisation and Italy’s cultural primacy (Primato).19 However, there was 
widespread historiographical enthusiasm regarding the Protestant Reformation. Conversely, the 
Renaissance was considered as a pre-modern cultural movement due to the lack of political liberty in 
Italy and the absence of the Reformation. To understand the relationship between the definition of 
Renaissance and the concept of modernity that shaped the idea of Europe during the Risorgimento, it 
is essential to describe it in a transnational perspective and especially within the framework of Hegel’s 
reception in Italy.20 As Axel Körner has commented: ‘[W]hat the new cultural and intellectual history 
of the Risorgimento has shown is that ideas are not passively received but translated into a new 
                                                           
18 On this topic, see Giorgio Spini, Risorgimento e protestanti (Turin: Il Saggiatore, 1989); on the 
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Religion and Liberty in the History of Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).  
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20 See, for example, Maurizio Isabella, Risorgimento in Exile (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009); Maurizio Isabella, ‘Nationality before liberty? Risorgimento political thought in transnational 
context’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 17 (2012), pp. 507–15; Raponi, Religion and Politics; 
Axel Körner, Politics of Culture in Liberal Italy: From Unification to Fascism (New York: 
Routledge, 2009); Lucy Riall, Garibaldi: Invention of a Hero (Yale: Yale University Press, 2007); 
Lucy Riall, ‘Travel, migration, exile: Garibaldi’s global fame’, Modern Italy 19 (2014), pp. 41–52; 
Lucy Riall and Oliver Janz, ‘The Italian Risorgimento: Transnational perspectives. Introduction’, 
Modern Italy 19 (2014). 
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context, where the final product often bears little similarity to the original’.21 The peculiarity of the 
interpretation of Italian Renaissance has to be understood within the broader transnational context. 
Within the Protestant cultural milieu, there was a notable and widespread negative 
understanding of the Italian Renaissance. This was partly due to the lack of a Protestant Reformation 
in Italy. In particular, Hegel argued that the birth of the modern spirit was represented by the 
Reformation, which was the ‘old and continually preserved inwardness of the German people’.22 He 
maintained that the philosophers of the Italian Renaissance, such as Giordano Bruno and Giulio 
Cesare Vanini, belonged to the Middle Ages, and he regarded the Renaissance as a period of 
dissolution and moral weakness. Even French interpreters judged the Italian Renaissance 
unenthusiastically. For example, the eclectic François Guizot maintained that Italy, like the other 
Catholic countries, could not have known modernity and progress because of the absence of the 
Protestant Reformation and its liberating consequences.23 The Genevan Jean-Charles-Léonard Simon 
de Sismondi traced the origins of the Renaissance to the life of the Italian comuni, the breeding ground 
of individual virtues. However, he also argued that those virtues did not take root in the Italian nation 
because of the absence of the Reformation.24  
Just as nineteenth-century European culture considered the Renaissance as a pre-modern 
cultural movement, so most Italian intellectuals of the nineteenth century also had a negative 
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understanding of the period due to the lack of political liberty and the absence of unity and 
independent nationhood. For instance, one of the most important political leaders of the 
Risorgimento, Cesare Balbo, interpreted the Renaissance negatively because of the absence of 
political liberty and the continuous foreign invasions.25 The most influential philosopher of the 
Risorgimento, Gioberti, criticised the Renaissance from the perspective of his Catholic morality and 
he offered justification of the Church’s persecution of promiscuity. Of course, he was persuaded that 
these problems were aggravated by the absence of national unity and independence. Italian 
conservatives did not consider the Renaissance as modern, nor as a period of cultural brightness, 
highlighting the Italian right to participate to the development of modern Europe without renouncing 
its Catholic roots. It is interesting to note that democratic and progressive groups took a similar view. 
The patriot and political leader, Giuseppe Mazzini, maintained that from a moral, political and civic 
perspective the Renaissance had to be considered ‘infertile’ for Italy because of the absence of 
political liberty, while the Reformation was contrasted as an ‘advantageous renovation’.26 The 
republican Giuseppe Ferrari also highlighted the issue of political division and foreign invasions, and 
he criticised an epoch which was focused only on the arts and the aesthetic life.27 These conceptions 
of modernity reinforced the perception of boundaries between a modern and civilised northern Europe 
and a backward and barbaric southern Europe, and they contributed to the idea of a fractured Europe 
that was based on a dichotomy between centre and periphery.   
In contrast to the other patriots and intellectuals of the Risorgimento, however, a positive 
meaning of the Renaissance was elaborated by the Neapolitan Hegelians. The main advocates of this 
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cultural movement, despite all their differences, conceived of the Renaissance as embodying the idea 
of modernity rather than as a cultural epoch, as defined by Burckhardt’s milestone Die Kultur der 
Renaissance in Italien (1860).28 The Hegelians insisted on the philosophical meaning of the 
Renaissance as the affirmation of the immanence of the divine nature in human nature, of the dignity 
and sanctity of the individual, and of the autonomy of consciousness from any moral and political 
authority. This specific definition of the Renaissance represented the individual assertion of autonomy 
from the state and any other political or religious power. It defined a concept of modernity that enabled 
some of the principles shaping the notion of a modern Europe to be sought in Italian history, and it 
offered an alternative to the dominant narrative of the ‘Protestant supremacy’. The Neapolitan 
Hegelian presentation of the Renaissance as marking the onset of modernity has to be understood 
both within the broader transnational debate on the origins of modernity as a reflection on the 
European heritage and with reference to Hegel’s reception in Italy. 
 
3. An alternative to Burckhardt’s Renaissance  
The political context of the Risorgimento is crucial to understanding the idea both of the Renaissance 
and of Europe elaborated by Neapolitan Hegelians. Traditional scholarly interpretations of the 
Renaissance have, however, overlooked the politically oriented passions of Risorgimento 
intellectuals.29 Scholars have assumed that those passions prevented the intellectuals from 
                                                           
28 Jacob Burckhardt, Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien (Basel, 1860). The first Italian translation, 
by Domenico Valbusa, was published in 1876. 
29 Benedetto Croce, ‘La crisi italiana del Cinquecento e il legame del Rinascimento col 
Risorgimento’, in Poeti e scrittori del Rinascimento (Bari: Laterza, 1939), I, pp. 1–16; Federico 
Chabod, ‘Gli studi di storia del Rinascimento’, in Carlo Antoni and Raffaele Mattioli (eds), 
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understanding their own role in defining modernity. This article argues instead that the political 
context of the Risorgimento influenced Neapolitan Hegelians’ interest in the idea of European 
modernity and their shaping of a narrative of modernity alternative both to that which asserted the 
‘Protestant supremacy’ and to the well-known thesis of the Swiss historian, Jacob Burckhardt.  
The literature, indeed, confirms that it was thanks to Jules Michelet’s Histoire de France 
(1855) and, especially, to Burckhardt’s book that the Renaissance became a key historiographical 
category for European historians.30 Burckhardt’s work is considered of crucial importance in modern 
studies on the Renaissance. Wallace Ferguson, in his monumental study The Renaissance in 
Historical Thought, has gone as far as to claim that Burckhardt’s thesis is the cornerstone of all 
ensuing historiographical interpretations of the Renaissance. Indeed, Ferguson argues that the Swiss 
scholar was the first to define the Renaissance as a distinct historical period and as a peculiar Italian 
experience. Ferguson maintains that Burckhardt’s writing is a ‘coherent synthesis’ which unified the 
different interpretations that the latter identified as characteristic of ‘modern progress’: ‘[T]he growth 
of individual freedom of thought and expression, the full development of self-conscious personality, and 
the evolution of moral autonomy founded upon a high conception of the dignity of man’.31 Federico 
Chabod, in his Gli studi di storia del Rinascimento, also recognised the role of Burckhardt’s book in 
                                                           
Buck (eds), Il Rinascimento nell’Ottocento in Italia e Germania – Die Renaissance im 19. 
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and influence of this book, see Lucien Febvre, ‘Come Jules Michelet inventò il Rinascimento’, in 
Problemi di metodo storico (Turin: Einaudi, 1976). 
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(Cambridge, MA: Riverside Press, 1948). 
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marking the separation between cultural and political history and in confirming the Renaissance as a 
‘historical category’, a ‘specific period’ and an ‘organic block’ from the fourteenth century to the 
beginning of the sixteenth century.32 Chabod’s thesis was that during the nineteenth century the 
historiographical question of the Renaissance concerned the beginning of modern thought and aspects 
of modernity, such as the understanding of life and history, and the relationships between human 
beings, God and nature. The European dimension of the Renaissance went beyond its Italian 
connotation. The link between cultural and political history restricted the meaning of the Renaissance 
to the problem of Italy’s national emancipation. The Renaissance, like other historical categories such 
as Romanticism or the Enlightenment, became one of the crucial historical periods of European 
intellectual life and one of the concepts of modernity that shaped the idea of Europe. According to 
Chabod, Burckhardt’s work changed the Risorgimento approach to historiography by separating 
culture from politics.33 The new historiography was used to evaluate the moral life of individuals and 
the patriotic virtues, such as amor patrii, and the love for liberty and independence.34 
Eugenio Garin has argued that Burckhardt’s study contributed to bestowing on the 
Renaissance a universal meaning, thereby separating it from previous movements of national 
regeneration.35 The problem of the prejudice of nineteenth-century Italian historiography was 
underlined by Delio Cantimori, who highlighted the need to rethink the Renaissance.36 Considering 
Burckhardt’s work as the linchpin of mainstream analysis of the Renaissance, Cantimori 
                                                           
32 Chabod, ‘Gli studi di storia del Rinascimento’, pp. 10–11. 
33 Federico Chabod, L’idea di nazione (Bari-Rome: Laterza, 2008). 
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35 Eugenio Garin, Il Rinascimento italiano (Milan: ISPI, 1941). 
36 Cantimori, ‘Sulla storia del concetto di Rinascimento’, passim. 
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differentiated the approach of the Swiss historian from that of Hegel,37 which was focused, instead, 
on the description of the development of the Renaissance.38 Furthermore, Cantimori maintained that 
most nineteenth-century Italian interpretations were influenced by Burckhardt’s history.39 The notion 
that Risorgimento Italian historiography on the Renaissance was too passionate and devoid of 
historical objectivity was also shared by Croce,40 who maintained that Italy’s missed Reformation 
was the most essential cause of its sixteenth-century decadence.41 Furthermore, Croce stressed the 
importance of the moral and religious dimensions of the Renaissance and, above all, the fact that 
‘decadence’ was caused by the absence of a moral ideal.42 He also noted that those patriots who 
interpreted the Renaissance as a failed religious and moral reformation had tried to accomplish that 
reformation through their political action.  
The main goal of historians such as Croce, Cantimori, Chabod and Dionisotti was to interpret 
the Renaissance without the political passions of nineteenth-century patriots. Their approach 
prevented them from understanding the role that those nineteenth-century interpretations had on 
Italian political emancipation. Indeed, the Neapolitan Hegelians’ interpretation of modernity must be 
considered not for its historiographical accuracy but for its political meaning. To understand the uses 
                                                           
37 See Michele Biscione, Neoumanesimo e Rinascimento: L’immagine del Rinscimento nella storia 
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e il Rinascimento’, in Fulvio Tessitore (ed.), Incidenza di Hegel (Naples: Morano, 1970), pp. 437–
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39 Ibid., p. 243. 
40 Croce, ‘La crisi italiana’, p. 2. 
41 Ibid., p. 7. 
42 Ibid., p. 9. 
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of the Renaissance in nineteenth-century Italian historical and political debates, it is useful to consider 
the peculiar connection between philosophy, history and politics that characterises ‘la vie publique 
de l’histoire’, the main feature of nineteenth-century Italian and European historiography.43 
Consideration of the political meaning of the what might be termed the ‘modern Renaissance’ helps 
to understand the idea of Europe developed by the Neapolitan Hegelians. In his recent study, The 
Other Renaissance, Rocco Rubini has described the importance of the idea of the Renaissance for 
Italian philosophy. Rubini has pointed out the central role that Neapolitan Hegelianism played in the 
reaction to the mid-nineteenth-century European perception ‘that Italy presented a twofold inferiority: 
it could not boast the civic and centralized infrastructure achievements of France or England, nor had 
it reached the universally acknowledged pinnacle that Germany, a country otherwise still struggling 
politically, had managed to achieve in the realm of thought’.44 However, Rubini does not connect the 
concept of the modernity of the Renaissance to the shaping of the idea of Europe. On the contrary, 
re-thinking Neapolitan Hegelianism returns the understanding of the Renaissance to the theoretical 
framework of European modernity. The Renaissance, conceived as a crucial part of European cultural 
heritage, shapes one European discourse that aims to re-define the relationship between centre and 
periphery. Indeed, Italian patriots were not contesting such a dichotomy; rather, they were trying to 
integrate Italy in the European core. 
 
4. The modern Renaissance of Bertrando Spaventa and Francesco De Sanctis 
Despite the growing literature on the Risorgimento, recent studies have failed to recognise the 
influence that the interpretation of the Protestant Reformation, as the key event of modernity, had on 
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the intellectual elite of the Risorgimento.45 Such studies also failed to consider the way Neapolitan 
Hegelians raised the issue of Italy’s imperfect modernity as part of their reflection on the idea of 
Europe and the origin of modern European culture. Indeed, in their writings emerged the transition 
from a philosophy of history, centred on the concept of ‘civilisation’ as historical progress – a widely 
accepted understanding of the notion in the early nineteenth century – to a philosophy of history that 
investigates the idea of modernity as a contradictory process emerging from the struggle of opposing 
forces. Recent scholarship on the Risorgimento has neglected Neapolitan Hegelianism, largely 
because of its essentially historical and political approach. However, there has also been a renewed 
interest in different European non-Marxist receptions of Hegel’s philosophy.46 During the nineteenth 
century, many Italian intellectuals discussed Hegel’s ideas in relation to their concern of creating a 
new ‘national’ culture and philosophy in a still-divided Italian state.  
What the Neapolitan Hegelians found so attractive in Hegel’s philosophy of history were the 
notion of freedom as the liberation of humanity through the struggle between the spirit and the reality, 
and the idea of progress and the emancipation of nations. These ideas were particularly important for 
the Risorgimento intellectuals who found in Hegel’s philosophy of history a certainty about the future 
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of Italian liberation. In its early stage, Neapolitan Hegelianism was open to the revolutionary potential 
of Hegel’s philosophy. The dialectical philosophy of history helped them to imagine (despite Hegel’s 
own caution) a future new age. Responding to Hegel’s call for liberation, Italy would again be part 
of Europe.47 Neapolitan Hegelianism played a significant role in shaping a national philosophy. It 
was a movement of young scholars who read, translated and interpreted Hegel’s philosophy in Italy, 
and it flourished for approximately forty years, from about 1837 to 1876.48 The movement’s main 
objective was to use Hegel’s philosophy to support the struggle of Italian political emancipation by 
stressing the importance of the process of self-consciousness that modern freedom required. A key 
characteristic of the movement was that most of its scholars came from the Kingdom of Two Sicilies 
and they all studied Hegel’s philosophy in Naples during the 1840s. The two most relevant exponents 
in the development of Neapolitan Hegelianism were Bertrando Spaventa and Francesco De Sanctis.49 
The cultural context of Hegel’s reception in Naples was described by Spaventa: 
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In Naples, starting in 1843, the Hegelian idea penetrated the mind of the young cultivators 
of science, who, united fraternally, took to advocating it in speech and in writing as if 
moved by saintly love. Neither the early suspicions of the police, stirred by ignorance and 
religious hypocrisy, nor their threats and persecutions could dampen the faith of these 
daring defenders of intellectual independence. The numerous students that deserted the 
old universities gathered in the great capital city from all the corners of the kingdom; they 
rushed in throngs to heed the new word. It was an irresistible and universal urge driving 
towards a new and wonderful future, toward an organic unity of the different branches of 
human knowledge […] it was a cult, an ideal religion, in which those young people 
demonstrated themselves worthy descendants of the miserable Bruno.50 
 
Spaventa was the first philosopher to challenge the Hegelian idea that Catholic countries were 
excluded from the process of European modernity. During the 1850s, while he was in exile in Turin 
for taking part in the revolution of 1848 in Naples, Spaventa began his study of the philosophers of 
the Renaissance.51 He maintained that the new idea of freedom emerging from the works of Giordano 
Bruno had deeper consequences in Italy than had the Reformation in northern Europe, since Bruno’s 
thought was not only a religious but also a philosophical and political reformation. Indeed, Spaventa 
contended that Bruno’s idea of Christianity, as the union of infinite divine nature and finite human 
nature, implied that every human being had an inestimable value and dignity and that no authority 
                                                           
50 Silvio Spaventa, Dal 1848 al 1861: Lettere, scritti, documenti, ed. by Benedetto Croce (Bari: 
Laterza, 1923), p. 322. 
51 For the last reconstruction of Spaventa’s work on the Renaissance, see Bertrando Spaventa, Scritti 
sul Rinascimento (1852-1872), ed. by Giuseppe Landolfi Petrone (Rome: Fabrizio Serra, 2011). For 
an overview of Spaventa’s thought, see Fernanda Gallo, Dalla patria allo Stato: Bertrando Spaventa, 
una biografia intellettuale (Bari-Rome: Laterza, 2012). 
19 
 
could coerce the human conscience. Spaventa’s objective was to demonstrate that what Luther 
achieved in Germany thanks to the Protestant Reformation was nothing less than what Bruno 
achieved in Italy with his idea of moral liberty. For Spaventa, Bruno’s idea of freedom was even more 
radical than the Reformation’s idea of moral freedom, and the Renaissance was to be regarded as the 
‘Italian version of the Protestant Reformation’. He also maintained that Italy’s philosophical 
revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries affirmed the principles of God’s immanence and 
of freedom of thought. In Spaventa’s estimation, Bruno was the main architect of this revolution. 
Bruno’s idea of moral freedom was based on the belief that human beings have a boundless value:  
 
According to Bruno, the intimate consciousness is a sanctuary that no human authority 
can penetrate nor violate. In their consciousness, human beings can freely develop their 
nature, having as unique law their own certainty and as judgment their own approval. The 
human beings, in their interior life, have an infinite and absolute value.52  
 
The principle of modernity expressed by Bruno is the divine command: do not persecute people for 
their thoughts and their works, their ideas and their words; let people be the owners of their 
consciousness. Spaventa recognised the two principles of Bruno’s philosophy – the autonomy of 
consciousness and the infinite value of human dignity – and made them the pillars of his 
understanding of modernity. These principles had been embodied by the Protestant Reformation and 
the Italian Renaissance, but whereas the former revolutionised the religious field alone, the latter, 
based on Bruno’s idea of the autonomy of consciousness and free from religious and secular 
authorities, had other effects in the fields of politics and philosophy – such, at least, was Spaventa’s 
reading. 
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Spaventa’s study of Bruno were part of his broader study of the Renaissance. He considered 
the Renaissance to be not only the core of Italian modernity but also the key event of what Spaventa 
called ‘the circulation of Italian and European thought’.53 His view of the relationship between Italian 
and European philosophy was deeply transnational: 
 
Italy opens the doors to modern civilization with a phalanx of heroes of thought. 
Pomponazzi, Telesio, Bruno, Vanini, Campanella, Cesalpino: all seem to be the sons of 
many nations. They serve more or less a prelude to all of the following courses of thought 
that constitute the period of philosophy from Descartes to Kant. If Bacon and Locke have 
their precursor in Telesio and Campanella, Descartes in Campanella, as well; Spinoza in 
Bruno, and in Bruno himself one finds a bit of the monadism of Leibniz. […] Finally, 
Vico discovers the new science; he anticipates the problem of knowledge, calling for a 
new metaphysics that proceeds on the basis of human idea […]. Vico is the true precursor 
of all Germany.54    
 
After Giambattista Vico, Italian thinkers were no longer the vanguard of European philosophy. The 
seeds of their thought would flourish in freer lands, such as Germany and Britain, and would exert an 
enormous influence on German idealism. Spaventa’s theory of ‘circulation’ was based on the belief 
that the modern world might be understood and interpreted only by a truly European philosophy, that 
is a philosophy detached from national traditions. Spaventa traces the development of modern 
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philosophy through different caesurae (stazioni) that marked changes of direction. In his view, 
modern thought began in Italy during the Renaissance and continued with Vico’s philosophy. 
Spaventa’s theory stood in stark contrast to the neo-Guelfist idea of Italian primacy in its emphasis 
on the tight connection between Italian and European philosophy and its denunciation of 
contemporary Italian cultural marginality.55 On the one hand, Spaventa claimed the specificities of 
Italian thought and its ‘national character’; but, on the other hand, he highlighted how ideas and values 
belonging to the Italian Renaissance had taken root in other countries. According to Spaventa, the 
lack of freedom, political and religious repression, and cultural isolation were among the reasons why 
the history of Italian philosophy was marked by caesurae. In particular, he believed that, despite its 
isolation and marginality, Italian culture was inherently modern. The two pillars of thought that 
supported the Italian Renaissance and shaped the modern conscience were the same as those of 
modern European philosophy: God’s immanence and the autonomy of human thought.  
In a different way to Spaventa, the Hegelian Francesco De Sanctis also highlighted, as did 
many other intellectuals at the time, the ‘splendid moral decadence’, arising from Italian corruption 
(corruttela), that characterised the Renaissance. This was regarded as the cause of the fall of the 
Italian free republics, and it persisted in preventing the Italian people from gaining political liberty. 
In his concern to reform the Italian character, De Sanctis was strongly influenced by a sort of ‘Luther-
centric approach’. This concern was tied to the attempt to understand why there had been no 
Reformation in Italy. Intellectuals gave an almost unanimous answer. As Cantimori has noted, they 
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believed that Italy was weak, corrupt, and enslaved to the cult of the form; consequently, a moral and 
intellectual reformation could not take root.56 In his L’uomo di Guicciardini, De Sanctis explained 
the uniformity of judgment among intellectuals, who argued that the cause of Italian decadence during 
the Renaissance was connected to religious factors.57 Much like Spaventa, De Sanctis had in mind 
Hegel’s interpretation that the origins of modernity lay in the Protestant Reformation. He also tried 
to re-evaluate the Italian role in modern history by casting Machiavelli as the Italian Luther: ‘Italy 
couldn’t have the Reformation, but with regard to freedom of consciousness and the participation in 
the foundation of the modern age, it had Machiavelli’.58 For De Sanctis, Machiavelli had been the 
source of a moral and intellectual renewal. Unlike Spaventa, he did not identify the philosophical 
principle of moral liberty with the main characteristics of Italian sixteenth-century philosophy. 
Although he rescued some of the characters of the Renaissance, including Machiavelli and Ludovico 
Ariosto, he considered that period as a moment of ‘splendid moral decadence’. This was because of 
the absence of religious and moral reformation. In this respect, De Sanctis was closer than Spaventa 
to the Hegelian scheme and to the European historiography of his day.  
The crucial element shared by De Sanctis and Spaventa in their interpretation of the 
Renaissance is their definition of modernity. This was shaped, on the one hand, by Hegel’s philosophy 
of history, and, on the other, by its ‘Italian version’. In their definition of modernity, De Sanctis and 
Spaventa sought in Italian political and scientific thought the same philosophical principle, that is, 
the unity of divine and human nature, infinite and finite, spirit and form. Both philosophers made 
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Hegel’s philosophy of history the linchpin of their own theories. However, while Spaventa focused 
on Bruno as the central character of modernity, De Sanctis conferred that role on Machiavelli, the 
most representative figure of the Italian republican tradition. This important difference between the 
two Hegelians partly depended on De Sanctis’ Swiss exile and the republican ethos he imbibed while 
in Zurich (1856-1860). It was during this transnational experience that De Sanctis focused on 
Machiavelli’s republican thought and defined his concept of the modern Renaissance on the basis of 
republican values.59 More importantly, De Sanctis saw in the Renaissance a sort of reformation that 
was scientific and philosophical rather than moral. He was adamant that, when corruption is 
ubiquitous, reformation can prepare a resurrection through science, thanks to individual and isolated 
thinkers who are usually persecuted but who firmly trust in their own thoughts. According to De 
Sanctis, Bruno, Campanella, Galileo, Giannone and Machiavelli are exemplars.60 Whereas Spaventa 
maintained that the philosophical reformation was deeper and more important than the religious one, 
De Sanctis considered the latter to be more important. He also regarded the scientific and 
philosophical reformation of the sixteenth century as the beginning of a moral reformation which was 
still in the process of completion.  
De Sanctis and Spaventa shared the same urge to rediscover the Italian character in order to 
reshape the Italian people and revive Italian thought by highlighting its originality and importance. 
Furthermore, they considered it their duty to reconnect Italy to its glorious past and to defeat Italian 
moral weariness. De Sanctis’ analysis of the Renaissance was more complex and cannot be reduced 
to the idea of moral decadence. He considered some figures of that period, in particular Machiavelli, 
                                                           
59 On De Sanctis’ exile in Zurich, see Fernanda Gallo, ‘Francesco De Sanctis interprete del 
Rinascimento’, in Enza Biagini, Paolo Orvieto and Sandro Piazzese (eds), Francesco De Sanctis 
(1817-2017), pp. 59-74. 
60 Francesco De Sanctis, ‘Conferenze su Niccolò Machiavelli’, in Opere: L’arte, la scienza e la vita 
(Turin: Einaudi, 1972), p. 48. 
24 
 
as the Italian source of modernity and as the instrument for defeating moral weariness. De Sanctis 
searched in the Italian Renaissance for both the source and the cure of moral weakness, which had 
been the main obstacle to Italy’s political and moral freedom in the modern age up to the 
Risorgimento. Considering this ambivalence in De Sanctis’ interpretation, one might note more 
similarities with Spaventa’s understanding of the Renaissance. In fact, both insisted on the importance 
of rediscovering the concept of moral liberty in the Italian thinking of the Renaissance as a way of 
including Italy in the process of European modernity. The Hegelians aimed at asserting Italy’s 
belonging to the European core, which involved challenging the widely accepted geographies of 
civilisation and intellectual borders that had shaped the idea of Europe. 
Other Italian interpreters of Hegel’s thought shared the notion of the Renaissance as the path 
to European modernity. Francesco Fiorentino (1834-1884) and Pasquale Villari (1827-1917) were 
also engaged in defining the modern nature of the Renaissance. Although Villari, like De Sanctis, 
saw the Renaissance as a period of splendid decadence, he was particularly fascinated by Girolamo 
Savonarola. Distinguishing Savonarola’s ideas from those of Luther, Villari sought to highlight the 
importance of the reformation movements taking place within the Catholic world and to understand 
Italian visions of and discourses about modernity.61 Fiorentino’s studies on the Renaissance are 
especially interesting for understanding the Neapolitan Hegelians’ contribution to the definition of 
the ‘Italian path to modernity’. Fiorentino’s works were informed, like those of his mentor Spaventa, 
by a strong civic interest, whereby historiographical, political and philosophical concerns were 
intertwined.62 Significantly influenced by Spaventa’s association of Renaissance philosophy with 
modern philosophy, Fiorentino regarded the study of the Renaissance as an exhortation to draw a 
‘path to modernity’. In Fiorentino’s work on the Renaissance, a theoretical structure arose that 
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combined Hegel’s philosophy of history and Spaventa’s thesis on the connection between the 
Renaissance and modern thought. Like Spaventa, Fiorentino identified Bruno as the central figure for 
the interpretation of the Renaissance.63 Again like Spaventa, he maintained that the philosophical 
revolution of the Italian Renaissance was deeper than the Protestant Reformation, since the latter did 
not portray the liberating elements so crucial to sixteenth-century Italian thought.64 In contrast to 
Spaventa, however, Fiorentino extended the chronological period of his analysis to the centuries 
before the sixteenth. He focused, with greater philological accuracy than Spaventa, on the authors of 
the Renaissance. Fiorentino’s interest in Renaissance philosophy was a constant feature on his 
intellectual path, and in his most important works one might note that the common thread was the 
accurate and precise rediscovery of the Renaissance’s philosophy.65 
 
5. Neapolitan Hegelianism and the idea of Europe 
The appreciation of Renaissance thinking by the Neapolitan Hegelians was a cultural activity with an 
explicit political and patriotic purpose to define Italy’s cultural identity and the construction of the 
Italian path to modernity. On the one hand, Spaventa and Fiorentino considered the Counter-
Reformation as the main cause of Italy’s moral decadence and the Catholic Church as the first enemy 
of Italian political and moral freedom. This meant that the Renaissance had been a triumphal moment 
in Italian history, marked by the philosophical rediscovery of the value of individual and of human 
dignity that was the sign of Italy’s modernity. Indeed, for these authors, the Renaissance was Italian 
modernity – but it was a modernity that had been viciously arrested by force, fire and prison. The 
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hero of that age had been, without doubt, Giordano Bruno. On the other hand, De Sanctis and Villari 
proposed a different understanding of the Renaissance as the locus of Italy’s moral decadence. De 
Sanctis saw in the Renaissance the beginning of modernity, defining it as a renewal (Rinnovamento). 
This meant that some aspects of the Italian modern spirit were manifest in the theories of some of its 
greatest minds. These ignited that process of moral autonomy and modernisation which, according to 
De Sanctis, should have been accomplished by the Italian unification. However, De Sanctis also 
considered the Renaissance to have been an age of decadence, the result of Italy’s constitutive moral 
weakness, and he believed this decadence had been amplified by the absence of a Protestant 
Reformation in Italy. For De Sanctis, the brightness of artistic and cultural form in the Renaissance 
contrasted with the period’s emptiness and obscurity of the inner life. Villari also viewed the 
Renaissance as a period of decadence because of the absence of a religious reformation, even though 
he praised the efforts and works of a handful of cultural and intellectual innovators from the period. 
From his perspective, the main problem of the Renaissance was the unstable balance between the 
‘emptiness of the heart’ and the ‘activity of the mind’. For both De Sanctis and Villari, the figure who 
most represented the complexity of the age was Niccolò Machiavelli.   
As a whole, the Neapolitan Hegelians tried to challenge the widespread thesis of the 
‘Protestant supremacy’, which implied a common anti-Catholicism and an ‘intra-European 
Orientalism’. Their aim was to build a path to modernity for the Catholic countries.66 When, in the 
nineteenth century, the European cultural model was consolidated, it did not consist of one coherent 
set of ideas. On the contrary, it comprised different orientations that shaped the European cultural 
imagination. The idea of modernity defined by the Neapolitan Hegelians was based on the main 
cultural achievement of the modern Renaissance. Here, when transcendence became immanent, the 
idea of human freedom and dignity finally emerged. The result was a new relationship with authority 
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in the sciences and in politics. However, no specific religion could claim ownership of such a 
principle. Nor could the principle be tied to specific climatic conditions or institutional and political 
traditions. On the contrary, it belonged to the philosophical revolution of modernity, and to the ‘realm 
of the spirit’ – to use a Hegelian expression – that shaped the modern idea of Europe.  
This remains a crucial question in current political debates, which repeatedly refer to the 
contrast between northern and southern European countries, a contrast that entails persisting ideas of 
northern economic development versus southern backwardness, and of northern political progress 
and civilisation versus southern inefficiency and corruption. This might be seen as a legacy of the 
‘Protestant supremacy’ narrative, according to which the sixteenth century witnessed two diverging 
paths: one path led, in the Protestant north, to three centuries of progress and expanding liberty; the 
other path, in the Catholic south, led to three centuries of decline and despotism. The contrast could 
not be more glaring. The claim that the Reformation paved the way for modern notions of progress 
and freedom was for long a common assumption in nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
historiographical debates. This has occluded the fact that the dichotomy between the Catholic south 
and the Protestant north itself has a history. Revisiting and understanding the beginnings of that 
history and shedding light on the Neapolitan Hegelians’ alternative narrative is a step towards 
challenging the historiographical topos of the ‘Protestant supremacy’. The solution offered by the 
Neapolitan Hegelians to Italy’s moral, philosophical and political decadence was a European cultural 
and philosophical revolution. The role they assigned to philosophy, or, rather, to the ‘realm of the 
spirit’, indicates a possible path today: the reconsideration of the role of philosophy in the building 
of a European civic consciousness. 
 
